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such transition, our epistemological convictions play an important role in 
the decision we make. J. Andrew Kirk and John Hick’s positions are two 
examples. While both care deeply about Christianity and peoples of other 
faiths, the conclusions that they reach from their different epistemological 
stances are telling in their differences, indicating the crucial role that 
epistemology plays in mission. As representatives of a broader group, their 
positions remind us of the importance of assessing our epistemic positions 
in relation to mission, especially in thinking about our theology of mission. 
This article presents and evaluates their epistemological positions and uses 
them as catalysts for conversations in exploring the theology of mission. 
The aim of this article is to illustrate the need for critically assessing the 
epistemological assumptions behind our theological positions so that we 
can effectively navigate the terrain of shifting theological paradigms in 
mission.
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Introduction
Beneath the disputes of the particular model of a mission or 
theology is the broader issue of epistemology—how we know what we 
know. Exploring the latter will help us develop a more informed grounding 
of the former. While those in the field of missiology are acutely aware of its 
importance, in the past, owing to their particular interest and desire, they 
have not paid enough attention to the interrelation between epistemology 
and theology. Jan A. B. Jongeneel once observed that the epistemological 
grounding of mission studies remains the most unexplored area of mission 
scholarship (1997:372). In 2004, J. Andrew Kirk wrote: “To my knowledge, 
the only published work which explicitly relates mission to epistemology 
is J. Andrew Kirk and Kevin Vanhoozer’s To Stake a Claim: Mission and the 
Western Crisis of Knowledge” (2004:131). In 2011, in Mission as Dialogue: 
Engaging the Current Epistemological Predicament of the West, Kirk 
reiterated that the tradition of epistemological engagement with missiology 
is a “relatively unexplored” area (2011:10).1
Kirk often contrasted his position with that of John Hick, a 
theologian and a philosopher. One reason why Kirk was unrelenting 
in engaging with Hick is because he (Kirk) thinks the latter’s position 
encapsulates the epistemological dilemma that undercuts the unique claims 
of Christianity at its foundational level (Kirk 2011:18, 87, 95; 2002:23–
36; 2000:27, 132). Both Hick and Kirk, in a way, are representatives of a 
broader group that attempt to articulate the epistemological predicament in 
the face of transition. While the second focuses on bridging the increasing 
disconnect between Christianity and Western secular culture, the first 
stresses resolving the conflicting claims of religions. Both articulated the 
contested claims about the ontological reality in ways consonant with their 
convictions. Although both genuinely care about people of other faiths and 
their truth claims, their epistemological convictions led them to different 
conclusions. As such, their positions are illustrative of the importance of 
epistemological posture in articulating our theology of mission. Hence, we 
use their positions as springboards for a more extensive discussion of the 
importance of epistemology in theology of mission.
The aim of this article is to illustrate the importance of critically 
assessing the epistemological assumptions behind our theological positions 
so that we can effectively navigate the terrain of shifting theological 
paradigms in mission. First, I will elaborate on how both Hick and Kirk 
postulate their epistemological position. Second, I will look into the context 
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from, in, and through which both theologians articulate their theological 
viewpoints, allowing us to evaluate their positions contextually. Third, 
based on our examination of the thoughts of both thinkers, I shall raise some 
questions and make some applications in the context of global Christianity, 
mainly from a theological angle. I shall then conclude by summarizing the 
key points.
Hick and Kirk’s Epistemological Postulation 
The Enlightenment period (ca. 1700–1850), as in the case of many 
other fields of study, brought a revolution in the area of epistemology. What 
is different in this modern theory from the pre-modern concepts (such as 
that of Plato’s notion of Forms) and that which is relevant to our purpose, 
is that metaphysics—the questions of what is real—comes under the mercy 
of epistemology (Myron B. Penner 2005:22). R. Albert Mohler Jr. observes 
that the epistemological turn during the Enlightenment period led many 
from what Charles Taylor terms as, “impossible not to believe” to “possible 
not to believe” (2008:36). According to Hans Frei, there was a sort of 
Copernican revolution in biblical interpretation beginning from the early 
eighteenth century. During this revolution, the biblical stories that were 
taken for granted as literal were beginning to be questioned (1974:1-5). 
As a result, Frei avers, such reorientation in approach affected both the 
radical thinkers and the conservatives (1974:4).2 Although we must not 
overemphasize the epistemological turn as others have rightly pointed 
out (Copleston 1994:435), we must also not overlook the difference from 
the earlier period, at least in emphasis (Copleston 1994:436–437; Penner 
2009:22; Bevans 2008:103–104). 
In this article, we trace the “epistemological revolution” in reference 
to Immanuel Kant’s construal of reality partly because of his important 
influence in epistemological discussion3 and because both Hick and Kirk 
invoke him in their discussions to either support their case (in Hick’s case) 
or deconstruct the other’s position (in Kirk’s case). Kant’s epistemological 
construal, in some ways, epitomized the shift in the condition of belief. He 
is skeptical that metaphysics as a science that transcends sense experience 
is possible (Kant 1965 [1781]:485ff). For him, humans do not have the 
intuition to perceive supersensible realities (say God). This is so, he argues, 
because we do not have access to the noumena—reality-in-itself—but 
only phenomena—things as they appear to us. While we can validate 
the claims about phenomena through our a priori intuitions, we cannot 
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perceive noumena, especially God, because we do not have the intuition to 
perceive them (Kant 1965 [1781]:89–90, 648ff). Kant thus challenged the 
commonly accepted notion that humans have direct access to reality. The 
result, as David Clark puts it, is, “knowledge results when the mind actively 
apprehends the world, shaping knowledge according to its own subjective 
categories” (2003:55). In Kant’s paradigm, human minds no longer conform 
to reality, but reality conforms to the mind. While Kirk is skeptical of the 
overall approach of Kant, Hick is sympathetic.4
In his autobiography, Hick wrote of Kant’s work thus: 
Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’, making the mind central 
to the process of cognition, seemed to me so significant 
that I devoted almost all of my final year at Edinburgh to 
a detailed study of the first Critique. I have retained from 
Kant what today I identify as ‘critical realism’—the view 
that there is a world, indeed a universe, out there existing 
independently of us, but that we can only know it in the 
forms provided by our human perceptual apparatus and 
conceptual systems (Hick 2005:69). 
Hick was only eighteen or nineteen at this time, i.e., during 1941-1942. He 
attempts to locate his position between what he calls a naïve realism and 
idealism. According to him, the idealist holds “that the perceived world 
exists only as a series of modifications of our own consciousness” and the 
naïve realist believes “that the world is just as we perceive it to be.” He opts 
for what he terms “critical realism” (Hick 1993:4). However, the critical 
realism he subscribes to has a nuanced Kantian flavor. He articulates critical 
realism as the belief that “there is an important subjective contribution to 
our perceiving it, so that the world as we experience it is a distinctively 
human construction arising from the impacts of real environment upon 
our sense organs, but conceptualized in consciousness and language in 
culturally developed forms” (Hick 1993:4). Regarding the material world, 
Hick, like Kant, claims to be a realist; but regarding immaterial things—
God, ethics, etc.—he is a relativist if not an agnostic (Hick 1993:3–6). 
Where Hick diverges from Kant is in his emphasis that our understanding of 
reality, especially God, is the projection of our experience (Hick 1993:159) 
whereas for Kant it is the postulation of the mind.
However, Hick suggests our experience does not exhaust the 
fullness of the transcendent, for we always experience the transcendent 
through our particular religious framework. Therefore, the transcendent 
cannot be confined to our particular experience. This means that no 
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experience of one religious group has more epistemic currency than others 
since different people experience the Real differently. Besides, were God 
to be immediately present to our experience, his power and mercy would 
overwhelm us (Quoted from Heim 1999:17). Therefore, the “epistemic 
distance” between God and humans, a logical necessity for humans to be 
autonomous persons (Hick 2010 [1966]:281), can be bridged only through 
faith (1966:68). It is here that he makes room for faith, an experience-based 
faith. The idea of the objectification of subjective epistemic experience 
in answering the question of the Real is what Hick developed from Kant. 
Although there are differences in their epistemological postulation (Heim 
1999:18; Hick 1966:57–68; Kirk 2002:23–36), what we focus on here is 
on the commonality. For Hick, one does not perceive the table; one always 
perceives it as the table. 
Kirk contends that in using Kantian epistemology, “Hick has made 
himself a hostage to fortune, for . . . [ultimately Hick’s framework] ends 
up with linguistic signs without any signification” (Kirk 2002:29). Although 
Hick attempts to differentiate from Kant, ultimately he succumbs to the 
fallacy of objectifying epistemology construed through one’s experience. 
This is problematic, Kirk argues, because the end result is implicit atheism 
(Kirk 2002:31). Like Kant, Hick’s hypothesis has shifted from the mind 
conforming to the objective reality to the reality conforming to the mind (in 
Hick’s case, religious experience). 
Alternately, Kirk argues for an epistemology that he thinks is 
capable of preventing the “disintegration of a unified field of knowledge 
that encompasses an understanding of both the external world of material 
objects . . . and internal world [of human values, purpose, relations, etc.]” 
(2011:14, 103–108). He acknowledges that regarding the first world, there 
is unanimity; the ambiguity is about the second world. The solution lays in 
incorporating the source of knowledge from the Word of God and the world 
of God (Kirk 2011:17). He suggests a heuristic device called “Inference to the 
Best Explanation” (IBE) that he thinks might serve as a useful missiological 
tool (Kirk 2011:20). IBE, in its simplest term “is the procedure of choosing 
the hypothesis or theory that best explains the available data.”5 Kirk means 
that since humans are created in the image of God and endowed with 
reason, Christians are (should be) able to have a meaningful dialogue with 
non-Christians by taking into account the “universally-available evidence 
and proven categories of rational argument. The truth claims that are 
made are related to self-awareness, human experience of the world, the 
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universal concourse of alternative traditions, ideas and explanation and are 
open to a critical exchange of views” (Kirk 2011:21). Unlike Hick, Kirk 
believes that “Christian faith . . . is the best of all possible explanations of 
our unique experience of the universe as human beings: one which offers 
the most coherent, consistent, and complete account” (Kirk 2011:21). 
Such an approach is both dialogical and dogmatic and is conducive to the 
postmodern context as opposed to ignoring the religious differences, Kirk 
contends.
Reflection Through the Historical Lens
Putting others’ works in the historical context is a helpful way to 
understand them. Whether it is Kant or Kirk or Hick, they were all attempting 
to articulate their “theistic” convictions in the face of challenges amidst 
transition. The case of Kant is not a pressing concern here, and hence we 
will focus on the other two.
Hick and Kirk have more things in common that they may or may 
not realize. They sincerely care about Christian mission, albeit in their own 
understanding. Both left their respective careers- Kirk, his military service, 
and Hick, his law education- in pursuit of the study of Christian ministry 
and service. The two are interested in interreligious dialogue. Both see 
the growing secularist culture as a threat to religious ethos and values. 
They are philosophically oriented in their approach. Although Hick was 
slightly the older (1922-2012), they share many experiences including their 
experience in military service—Kirk (1937–) as an active soldier and Hick 
as a medical assistant since he was a conscientious objector. In the light 
of all those shared experiences, it is unsurprising to see the intersection in 
their articulation of Christianity in their respective contexts.6 
However, the most common experience between the two, and 
one that is of more significant interest to our immediate context is their 
intercultural and interreligious experiences. It is of interest to observe that 
life-changing experience for both came about as a result of their cross-
cultural interaction particularly in the late1960s, a period that will become 
relevant again in our discussion later. Hick moved to Birmingham, UK, in 
1967, “where he encountered another set of experiences that dramatically 
affected his life and work” (IEP).7 The Birmingham experience was a second 
life-transforming experience, the first of which was his personal conversion 
at the age of eighteen. Of his conversion, he recounts rather dramatically: 
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I was kneeling at a chair when Jeffreys, coming round 
the circle, laid his hands on my head. I immediately felt 
a strong physical effect, like an electric shock except that 
it was not a sharp jolt but a pervasive sensation spreading 
down through my body. I was in floods of tears—not of 
sadness or fright but, I suppose, a tremendous emotional 
impact. Although people who have never experienced 
such things pooh-pooh them I am in no doubt that there 
are individuals through whom a real psychic force of 
some kind flows (Hick 2005:27–28).
In Birmingham, he was exposed to people of different cultures, 
religions, and races. He reflects of his life experience thus: “As I spent 
time in the mosques, synagogues, gurudwaras and temples as well as 
churches something very important dawned on me. On the one hand all 
the externals were different . . . But at a deeper level it seemed evident 
to me that essentially the same thing was going on in all these different 
places of worship. . .” (Hick 2005:160). He was also working on civil rights 
issues. Although he had read Kant with great fascination in his early years 
(Hick 2005:68–69), these real, on-the-ground life experiences prompted 
him to critically assess his theological convictions relying largely on Kant’s 
macro paradigm of phenomenal/noumenal hypothesis. The result was a 
pluralistic hypothesis as many of his writings that emerged from his time 
from Birmingham show: Christianity at the Centre (1968), Arguments for 
the Existence of God (1970), God and the Universe of Faiths (1973), The 
Myth of God Incarnate (1977), God Has Many Names (1980), The Second 
Christianity (1983), Problems of Religious Pluralism (1985), among others.
Kirk had similar life-changing experiences in the 1960s. He 
traveled to Argentina in 1967 and witnessed the social, political, and 
religious unrest as they related to civil rights (Kirk 2004a:71). There he 
observed the seductive power of the secularist agenda and the danger of 
the church uncritically aligning with the dominant ideological forces (in 
this particular case, the military dictatorship). Kirk sighed, “[Although the 
Church] came to regret its cultural captivity to the forces of the extreme 
political right . . . the church found it virtually impossible to express 
officially real repentance for the errors it made” (Kirk 2004a:71–72). 
His experience in, and reflection of, the inter-cultural context led him to 
reassess his theological position, the result of which was his dissertation 
published later as Liberation Theology: An Evangelical View from the Third 
World (1979). In it, he was both sympathetic and critical of the methodology 
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of liberation theology. He was sympathetic with the conviction that all 
theologies should take account of the experiential realities of the ordinary 
people in theologizing; he was critical of letting the experience become 
normative in interpreting the Scripture (Kirk 2011:207). In retrospect, 
Kirk may not seem to have offered much in terms of his theological and 
hermeneutical proposal; however, taking his work in context, it holds more 
value than it appears today. Later, through his interaction with evangelical 
scholars like John Stott and particularly Leslie Newbigin—with the latter 
being especially formative, which Kirk acknowledges (Kirk 2004a:73)—
he began to articulate his philosophical grounding of Christianity more 
acutely. The result was a book that he co-edited with Kevin Vanhoozer and 
also contributed a chapter to: To Stake a Claim: Mission and the Crisis of 
Knowledge (1999).
Before we take the views of Hick and Kirk in conversation with the 
broader context of world Christianity, I would like to draw our attention to 
an important missiological and theological point from the discussion thus 
far. The aim of this article, as stated earlier, is to illustrate the importance of 
critically assessing the epistemological assumptions behind our theological 
positions so that we can effectively navigate the terrain of shifting 
theological paradigms. Thomas Kuhn, writing from the context of scientific 
development (1996 [1962]), observed that when new discoveries can no 
longer neatly fit into the old ways of conceiving reality, a new interpretive 
model or paradigm emerges. Tension arises, and usually, the old models 
fade away. The application of a Kuhnian sense of paradigm shift to theology 
and mission is an important discussion, but we cannot enter into a detailed 
conversation here, except for one particular clarification.8
While not completely transporting the Kuhnian sense of the 
paradigm shift to theology, Hans Küng, in Paradigm Change in Theology, 
applied the framework to theology (1989a:3–33 [1980]). Because of the 
ambiguity related to the term “paradigm” Küng suggests terms such as 
“interpretive models, explanatory models, and models of understanding” 
(Küng 1989a:7). While he admits that there “is never an absolute break 
with the past” in theology even in the change of paradigm (Küng 1989a:30), 
he argues that macro changes (not just micro) take place in theology just 
like in science (Küng 1989a:214). By it, he means, “fixed and familiar 
concepts are changed; laws and criteria controlling the admissibility of 
certain problems and solutions are shifted; theories and methods are upset” 
(Küng 1989a:21). Just “as in the change from geocentric to the heliocentric 
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theory,” one theological model can replace the other (1989a:21, 23). Küng 
seems to have arrived very close to Kuhn’s use of paradigm. What is of 
pressing importance here, however, is the historical context on which Küng 
articulated his thoughts.
In the mid-twentieth century, as Christians around the globe 
came into close juxtaposition and as they gained greater exposure to the 
cultures of other peoples and religions, they were once again reminded of 
the urgency of taking the experiences, worldviews, and claims of others 
seriously. Although such interaction with other cultures, religions, and fellow 
Christians was the very atmosphere upon which Christian mission found its 
origin and theological foundation in the early centuries, the church and 
the world were divided due to geographical, political, and ecclesiastical 
reasons for too long. This division was breaking down, and now Christians 
had to relearn to navigate this new terrain. The documents of Vatican II show 
that in the 1960s there was an intentional theological reorientation (within 
the Roman Catholic Church at least) with a much more optimistic approach 
to other religions and cultures (Abbott 1966:580–633, 665–668). Whether 
the Council came to affirm that non-Christian religions could be salvific or 
not is a matter of debate (Roukanen 1990:56). What is clear is that at least 
some notable Catholic theologians like Karl Rahner and Küng were more 
optimistic than others. In 1964, the 31st International Eucharistic Congress 
was held in Mumbai, India. There, Küng delivered a message that captures 
the sentiments of at least some Roman Catholic thinkers. His message was 
entitled, “The World Religions in God’s Plan of Salvation.” In it, he argued 
that world religions should be regarded as an ordinary means of human 
salvation and the Roman Catholic Church as an extraordinary way (Küng 
1967 [1965]:51–52). Küng calls for moving away from an ecclesio-centric 
approach to a more theo-centric understanding of religions.
Hick finds Küng’s theological posture optimistic and welcoming, 
but not revolutionary (1973:120–132). Hick saw that although Küng was 
generous in his attempt to accommodate non-Christian religions, he still 
operates on the old, to use Hick’s terminology, “Ptolemaic” conception 
with Christianity at the center (Hick 1973:131). He insisted that to bring 
about a Copernican revolution would require “a shift from the dogma that 
Christianity is at the centre to the realisation that it is God who is at the 
centre..” (Hick 1973:131). For him, to be dogmatic of the uniqueness of 
Christianity in the light of the many truth claims is to ignore its historical 
relativity (Hick 1973:132). Hick wants to operate on what I would call an 
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“interpretive view”—a concept that I will revisit later—in which each one 
is allowed to interpret reality through his or her experience. 
We have seen how, beginning from the 1960s, Hick’s pluralistic 
outlook was emerging as he spent time in the city of Birmingham “outside 
of class with multi-faith groups working on race issues in and around the 
city” (IEP). Kirk’s theological conviction was also refined in the city of 
Birmingham as he spent time with people of other faiths, especially the 
“Muslims who he met monthly for the discussion of both important social 
issues and the essential questions of… faiths” (Kirk 2004a: 74). Like Hick, 
those experiences “prompted [Kirk] to consider seriously matters relating 
to the reality of diverse religions as an aspect of Christian mission” (Kirk 
2004a:74–75). He saw that at the bottom of the different truth claims—
be it religious, generational, or cultural—are the contested claims of 
epistemology. Hence, Kirk affirmed, the crisis in mission, at least in the 
West, is first and foremost, the crisis of epistemology (Kirk 2011:46–59). 
Necessarily, therefore, Christians must begin with an epistemological stance 
that is both able to authenticate their claims and dismantle the antithetical 
views. 
For Kirk, a Christian epistemology must begin with a realist 
framework that can accommodate propositional truth claims (Kirk 2011:49). 
This means, among other things, a provision to claim a true and objective 
knowledge of God, by which he means, “knowledge of God in-Godself 
can be true without having to be exhaustive” (Kirk 2002:n22). In this sense, 
Kirk operates on what I designate as a “dogmatic view” (see below). There 
is, and should be, certain core values and beliefs in our missional posture, 
and these principles are “distinguishable from the cultural formulations 
of them” (Kirk 2002:49). Nonetheless, he recognizes that there is no such 
thing as biblical epistemology if by the term it means a single theory of 
knowledge supported by the biblical text. Therefore, he believes that it is 
more helpful to talk about rethinking mission rather than “reinventing the 
wheel de novo” (Kirk 2011:47). Whereas in the former project, we readjust 
our theological views in the light of new evidence without necessarily 
surrendering our core convictions, in the latter, we demand that others 
abandon their whole theological framework (Kirk 2011:47).
Our main point in this section has been to look at the works 
of Hick and Kirk through the lens of their respective historical context. 
In doing so, we were able to get a more refined picture of how their 
epistemological postures influenced their theological articulation. Without 
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denying the possibility of other forces shaping their views, we could argue 
that since both had similar intercultural and interreligious experiences 
but developed different theological outlooks, it is more reasonable to say 
that their epistemology shaped their theology rather than that their life 
circumstances and educational upbringing determined their epistemology. 
David K. Clark’s dictum, although uttered in different context, seems to 
reflect what I am trying to say: “What people start with determines what 
people will end up with” (Clark 2000:283). Even if we may argue that for 
some their theological decisions do not correlate with their epistemological 
convictions, it remains true that it does for people like Kirk and Hick. We 
shall now turn to a more global conversation by using Hick’s and Kirk’s 
positions as trajectories to investigate a contemporary theology of mission. 
Lessons, Challenges, and Propositions 
In this section, using the thought frame of Hick and Kirk, I would 
like to explore how our epistemological inclination tends to direct the 
choices we make, particularly in the context of our theology and mission. 
I shall do this by looking at the way global Christianity responded during 
the transition in the mid-twentieth century and probing further questions for 
more clarity on the matter. 
Let us recall the labels “interpretive” and “dogmatic” referring to 
Hick and Kirk’s positions with one important exception. Unlike Hick, most 
Christians affirm the ontological existence of God. Hence, we take that for 
granted while keeping the rest of Hick’s idea, i.e., our knowledge of the 
Real is always mediated through our contextual lens, be it language, mental 
scheme, culture, etc. Let the word “dogmatism” not appall you. By it, I 
am referring to the realist position, as Kirk held, i.e., there is an objective 
truth, and we can know it as such. We may not know truth exhaustively, 
but we may know it truthfully. Although labels and generalizations have 
the tendency for simplification and often risk misrepresentation, they 
can be helpful in demarcating and clarifying an underlying ideological 
premise. We need not necessarily see them in terms of polarity but as two 
different emphases in a spectrum with various positions in between them. 
These different epistemological postures have missional and theological 
implications.
310     The Asbury Journal    74/2 (2019)
Resonant of the Enlightenment period, there was a sort of 
epistemological re-orientation in the field of global theology in the mid-
twentieth century. Although Christians have been missionaries, done 
mission work, and thought about mission throughout the centuries, it 
was in the mid-twentieth century that missiology as a specialized field of 
study gained greater traction (or at least, missiology as we understand it 
today). The first missiology chair, established in 1896 in Germany (Küster 
2014:170), anticipated a wider recognition and reproduction. The 1910 
World Missionary Conference held at Edinburgh was instrumental in 
paving the way, yet a more robust missional repercussion of Edinburgh 
arose only after two or three decades. The development and study of 
world Christianity in the mid-1940s (Pachuau 2018:5), the shifting focus 
from “church-centered mission to a mission-centered church” following 
the Conference of World Mission and Evangelism in Willingen in 19529 
(Bosch 1995:370), the re-orientation of Roman Catholic attitudes toward 
non-Christian religions following the Second Vatican Council in the 
1960s (Bosch 1995:265; Küster 2014:172), the independence of national 
churches from their Western “mother” churches following the rise of post-
colonial nations giving birth to “postcolonial” readings of the scriptures 
(R.S. Sugirtharajah 2003:1–3), and the increase in reverse migration 
beginning from 1960s (from the rest of the world to the West) leading to 
a more informed knowledge of the Majority World Christianity (Bryant 
Myers 2017:115–116) brought about a more decisive epistemological 
paradigm shift in mission. For instance, in reaction and as an alternative to 
what they perceived as a Western-dominated theology, a group of majority 
theologians (twenty-two, to be precise) gathered together in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania in 1976 to map out their own path. Together they were able to 
affirm, “We are prepared for a radical break in epistemology which makes 
commitment the first act of theology and engage in critical reflection on the 
praxis of the reality of the Third World” (Sergio Torres and Virginia Fabella 
1976:269). While Christians have always critiqued the dominant and unjust 
paradigm of discourse, what is particular about this period is the emphasis 
on the “epistemologically decolonizing” critique from the Majority World 
(Erinque Dussel 2018:562). 
During every transition, Christians have had to negotiate the 
principles of universality and particularity. The formulation of the Ancient 
Creeds, the Protestant Reformation, and the Roman Catholic Councils are 
examples of such negotiations. What is unique to theological proposals 
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in the twentieth century is the rise of global theologies. The independent 
nations perceived the vigorous exertion of the Western global market, values, 
and imperialistic posture as a threat to their pre-existent cultures and local 
autonomy. This triggered a reactive force in the form of what Scholte call 
“micro-nations” or “region-nations” that sought to build national identities 
and protect local values (Scholte 2005:231–237). The exogenous force of 
globalization thus created endogenous challenges that the existing theology 
was not equipped to tackle. Perhaps the neatly defined epistemological 
categories that have a long pedigree in the Western philosophy and often 
communicated with Western forms did not immediately resonate with 
the experience of the global Christians, many of who were beginning to 
discover and experience the richness of the newfound faith. Whether the 
transition caused the “epistemological break” or whether it provided an 
occasion for the break is a topic of its own. What is relevant here is the 
recently “freed” independent colonies began to recontextualize the gospel 
in ways that bear more relevance to their daily lives. This transition led 
to the emergence of many forms of local theologies such as Liberation 
theology, Minjung theology, Dalit theology, Tribal theology, etc. 
A subtle form of the interpretive view of reality found a welcoming 
home in some Third-World theologies. Per Frostin argues that amidst the 
differences of many contextual theologies resides a common characteristic: 
“a fresh epistemological approach which implies a new theological 
methodology” (Frostin 1985: 127). Bosch observed how various contextual 
theologies arose from the epistemological break from the commonly held 
belief that the world is a static object that human minds can understand. 
In the new paradigm, he continues, “the world is [seen as] an unfinished 
project being built” (Bosch 1995: 424). Our understanding then becomes a 
process, not the finished product or photograph of the original. Such a view 
affects the way mission is conceived and executed. 
While each emphasis has its own place, misplacing them may be 
problematic. It seems obvious that when the subjectivity or situatedness 
is pushed to the extreme, the overarching interpretive lens comes to be 
identified with language, tradition, culture, gender, religion, etc. Depending 
on one’s epistemological leniency, we would shift towards either an 
“interpretive” or “dogmatic” view. There is place and time to be “dogmatic” 
and “interpretive.” Our challenge is to delineate when, where, and why.
Given the challenges that our epistemology influences, if not 
determines, our theology and mission, what are some steps we can take so 
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that we make a responsible decision? While there may be many answers 
to this question, I would like to consider one area: revisiting the concept 
of critical realism. The term “critical realism” is now an acceptable term in 
theology and mission but needs further discussion through interdisciplinary 
and intercultural lenses if it is to remain an effective tool for constructing a 
theology of mission. 
Although our first reaction may be to label Hick’s position as 
non-realist, he might disagree with such categorization. After all, he 
claims to be a critical realist and strongly contends against the view of 
non-realist (1993:1–10). Granted his position is not consistent or that there 
are contradictions with his positions, yet he is more of a relativist than 
a non-realist. Nonetheless, appealing to or using critical realism, as he 
did, does not automatically settle the epistemological complexity because 
while most agree on the “realism,” many differ on the “critical” part. This 
principle applies to others as much as it does to Hick. 
Some have challenged the way N.T. Wright and Paul Hiebert use 
critical realism.10 Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts stress the ambiguities 
and inconsistencies in the version of Wright’s predecessors’ from which he 
(Wright) builds his case (Porter and Pitts 2015:276–306). Quoting Lonergan’s 
own words, Porter and Pitts sum up their view on Lonergan’s position: 
“What is grasped in insight, is neither an actually given datum of sense nor a 
creation of the imagination but an intelligible organization that may or may 
not be relevant to data” (Porter and Pitts 2015:289). They contend that the 
“internalist theory” upon which their (Wright et al.) critical realism is built 
is not without its challenge. They assert, “Wright’s epistemology, following 
Meyer, who follows Lonergan, picks up on this same self-reflective feature 
of internalism…” (Porter and Pitts 2015:292). Hence, Porter and Pitts call 
for return to a form of externalism or a reworking of internalism, which they 
think is more philosophically sustainable, chimes better with the current 
epistemological studies, and fulfills one of Wright’s original purposes for 
developing critical realist account, i.e., the historical study of Jesus (Porter 
and Pitts 2015:301–302). They reasoned that what many call naïve realism 
is not so naïve or else why would philosophers maintain a position that they 
think is naïve (Porter and Pitts 2015:286)?
While many missiologists have found Hiebert’s proposal of critical 
realism ingenious and embraced it, Normal Geisler, a theologian and 
philosopher, has pointed out the ambiguity, and consequently challenged 
the weakness, in Hiebert’s position (Geisler 2010:133–153). Geisler points 
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out, and I think rightly so, that although Hiebert repeatedly uses the term 
“critical realism” and warns of the danger of total skepticism and complete 
dogmatism, he does not clearly spell out how our talk about God and his 
Word could be analogically true (Geisler 2010:134). 
The criticism against Wright’s and Hiebert’s use of critical realism 
reminds us of the seriousness of assessing one’s philosophical rationality 
in making epistemic claims. By “philosophical rationality,” I mean ways of 
reasoning that are coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory, reasoning 
that must undergird any culture and religion to have meaningful discourse. 
While it is true that the debate between different epistemological theories 
is complex and ongoing and the veracity of our truth claims may not 
always depend on our ability to make a comprehensive case for the theory 
we espouse, it also remains true that we need to give careful attention 
to the theory we espouse. Some form of critical realism is not without 
shortcoming.11 
Brian Lee Goard, after surveying the different uses of critical 
realism in various disciplines reaffirms the argument of Paul Allen thus: 
“Critical realists do share a few common assumptions and a general 
definition, yet they draw different conclusions in their applications of 
critical realism” (Goard 2011:69; Allen 2006:49). Goard counsels that 
while critical realism has many potential elements for developing a robust 
theology, it can also become problematic if and when combined with 
ambiguous definitions of revelation, religious experience, God’s Word, etc. 
(Goard 2011:171–206). The issue is not so much that our understanding 
of reality is contextually mediated, but how exactly it is mediated is not 
always clarified just as was the case even among the earliest critical realists 
(Porter and Pitts 2015:281).12 
My intention here is neither to make Hick appear more 
“conservative” than he really was, nor to portray that Wright and Hiebert 
are like Hick. Rather, it is to point out that ambiguity lurks behind the use 
of the term and when applied to missiology it could become problematic. 
Hiebert’s critical contextualization, developed from the notion of critical 
realism, was timely and provided a smoother and more acceptable 
path (for example, than that of Charles Kraft) to navigate the changing 
paradigm in the 1970s (Eunhye Chang et al. 2009:199–201). And now, 
we must continue to wrestle with what exactly critical realism looks like 
in developing a contemporary theology of mission. This is one area that 
deserves further investigations through a missiological lens as others have 
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attempted it through their respective vantage points (for example, McGrath 
2002:195–244 and Goard 2011). 
Kirk recognizes that accepting critical realism as a judicious 
position between naïve realism and skepticism does not solve the problem 
because critical realism gives the impression that we can comprehend 
reality only fallibly but never certainly (Kirk 2007: 173). Hence, he 
wants to avoid using the adjective “critical.” He asserts, “I wish to defend 
a position that equates my perception of reality with reality, per se, but 
always allowing for error on my part” (Kirk 2007:173 n. 19). He calls this 
position a correspondence theory of truth. After discussing various theories 
of knowledge, he wrote thus, “Understood as means for distinguishing 
between truth and error, some of these theories have merit. However, the 
correspondence theory is the only one that deals with the nature of truth as 
such” (Kirk 2007:167). Kirk’s explanation, however, has left us wondering 
how his theory of correspondence could be reconciled with the different 
epistemological stances that Christians bring into interpreting reality and 
the Word of God. Kirk, who has paid close attention to this aspect of 
missiology, has left the job for us to continue.
Conclusion
I only hope to have raised the importance of epistemology in 
relation to mission. Perhaps I have raised more questions than is necessary 
or will be able to provide answers even in this regard. Even then, I would 
have accomplished something, i.e., to bring to awareness the importance 
of the epistemological posture in our mission. Some other questions need 
critical attention as well: epistemology and Bible, epistemology and 
hermeneutics, epistemology and theology, all of which are inter-related and 
relevant to mission.
However, in this article, we have focused on the importance of 
epistemology in the theology of mission. I have used Hick and Kirk to 
illustrate and emphasize the significance of our epistemology as it relates 
to mission. I have accentuated the importance of critically assessing the 
epistemological assumptions behind our theological positions so that we 
can effectively navigate the terrain of shifting theological paradigms in 
mission. In emphasizing my thesis, I have pointed to the need for ongoing 
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study in this area since there are some important questions and ambiguities 
related to this topic. 
If the choice for me were to leave with you only one application, 
then it would be the importance of epistemology in the theology of mission. 
Our epistemological posture influences our theology of mission more than 
we realize or acknowledge. Hence, we ought to give more serious attention 
to that aspect. This does not mean that we have to know all the philosophical 
languages associated with epistemology or that we have to be aware of 
all the epistemological debates. Although such knowledge and awareness 
are desirable, they are not mandatory. After all, as D. C. Schindler rightly 
puts it, “epistemology need not be explicit to be operative in any given 
case…” (Schindler 2007: 183). However, it means that we have to be able 
to critically evaluate why we believe what we believe and whether we have 
reasonable grounds to hold our beliefs. Regardless of our knowledge of 
epistemological theory, we are already exercising our epistemic conviction, 
and it would benefit us to assess where we stand critically.
End Notes
 1 This is not to claim that missiologists were unaware of the 
importance of epistemological grounding. As early as 1985, Paul Hiebert 
began to articulate the importance of epistemology in theology and mission 
(1985a and 1985b). Hendrick Kraemer shows deep awareness of the issue 
in discussing the interreligious relationships (Kraemer 1963 [1938]:61–
100). Beginning from 1950’s Leslie Newbigin wrote and reflected on 
various issues with keen epistemological, theological, and philosophical 
awareness and grounding. However, it may be true that missiologists and 
mission practitioners were more focused on adopting a particular mission 
strategy than in resolving the underpinning epistemological tensions.
 2 Kevin Vanhoozer interestingly notes that recent understanding 
of biblical theology, as articulated by James M. Hamilton (and others) as 
an attempt to understand the Bible on its own term before it could be 
meaningfully communicated, reverses Frei’s “great reversal” (2014:24, n 
23).
 3 Kant’s postulation, according to Frederick Copleston, was 
not merely a synthesis of the opposing and irreconcilable views of the 
continental rationalism and British empiricism; rather it was, in important 
ways, superseding over the two by critically incorporating some elements 
from both (Copleston 1994:428–430). Although Copleston does not 
consider such stance as necessarily positive, he believes, “Kant in particular 
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exercised a most powerful influence in this respect [i.e., epistemology]” 
and this influence continued to be felt in the diverging schools of thoughts 
that were to come later (Copleston 1994:438–439).
 4 There is a danger in overstating Kant’s polarization of the 
phenomena and noumena; however, it is to the aspect of Kant’s epistemic 
uncertainty of the noumena that both are invoking.
 5 Jonathan Vogel, “Inferences to the Best Explanation.” https://www.
rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/inference-to-the-best-explanation/v-1 
(accessed September 30, 2018).
 6 J Andrew Kirk, “My Pilgrimage in Mission,” International Bulletin 
of Missionary Research 28, no. 2 (April 2004):70–74. John Hick: Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/hick/#H1 (accessed 
September 30, 2018).
 7 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP).
 8 For a discussion of Kuhnian paradigm in relation to theology, see 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1997:138–150), David Bosch (1995:181–189), Hans 
Küng (1989a:3–33). 
 9 It was in the Willingen conference that the concept of Missio 
Dei—an idea that is to become key in theology of mission—was charted 
out in more detail, although the term was not used in the conference 
(Bosch 1995:390). The spread of the global Charismatic movements in the 
twentieth century and influence of the anthological insights in the mission 
studies are two other vital factors that contributed to the epistemological 
reorientation. 
 10 Wright and Hiebert’s definitions are not very different from 
that of Hick’s. Consider Hick’s definition of critical realism as it relates to 
religious claims: “a critical religious realism affirms the transcendent divine 
reality which the theistic religions refer to as God; but is conscious that this 
reality is always thought of and experienced by us in ways which are shaped 
and coloured by human concepts and images [italics inserted]” (1993:7). 
Now compare Wright’s definition: “[Critical realism] is a way of describing 
the process of ‘knowing’ that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, 
as something other than the knower (hence ‘realism’), while we also fully 
acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the 
spiraling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower 
and the thing known (hence ‘critical’) . . . Knowledge, in other words, 
although in principle concerning realities independent of the knower, is 
never itself independent of the knower [italics original]” (Wright 1992:35). 
Hiebert’s definition of critical realism in 1985 (this is before Ben Meyer and 
Wright’s incorporation into their respective fields) is very close to Hick’s. 
Hiebert writes, “Critical realists hold to objective truth, but recognize that 
it is understood by humans in their contexts. There is, therefore, an element 
of faith, a personal commitment in the knowledge of truth” (Hiebert 
1985b:16–17). Hick’s argument is that the epistemic distance between God 
and human is to be bridged by faith (Hick 1966:66–68). All of them admit 
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the existence of the Real, yet they acknowledge that the only access to the 
Real is mediated either through our experience or conceptual schema.
 11 Roy Bhasker, who is commonly associated with the term “critical 
realism,” was himself not a Christian and was more comfortable with an 
epistemological relativism (Bhasker 2008: 240–241). 
 12 For example, in his widely accepted book, Models of Contextual 
Theology (2008), Bevans assumes a form of critical realism similar to 
Lonergan’s (Bevans 2008:4, 4n. 11). He explains that reality is mediated by 
meaning, “a meaning that we give it in the context of our historical period, 
interpreted from our own particular horizon and in our own particular 
thought forms” (Bevans 2008:4). While I agree with Bevans in some ways, I 
would add that we must also emphasize the shared commonality of human 
experience, rationality, God’s Word, Holy Spirit, and the possibility of 
bridging our differences through conversations.
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